Palavras-chave
Governança corporativa
Desempenho
Corporate governance
Performance
Como Citar
Resumo
A governança corporativa é considerada um mecanismo que possui como objetivo o alinhamento entre as ações dos administradores e os interesses dos acionistas. Pesquisas realizadas no final da década de 1980 e início da década de 1990 identificaram que a relação entre a rotatividade dos executivos (turnover) e o desempenho da entidade pode ser considerada uma métrica para avaliar a eficiência de um sistema de governança corporativa. Essa métrica tem sido estudada em economias desenvolvidas, como Estados Unidos, Dinamarca e Japão, mas pouco abordada em países de economia considerada emergente. Diante disso, este estudo teve como objetivo verificar se o desempenho das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto influencia na probabilidade de turnover dos altos cargos da administração, tendo como foco as companhias listadas na B3 no período de 2012 a 2017. A amostra foi constituída por 87 empresas, e o modelo utilizado foi o de regressão logística. Os resultados apontaram coeficientes negativos e significativos para as variáveis Retorno do Patrimônio líquido, Retorno das ações e Propriedade familiar. Dessa forma, pôde-se concluir que o desempenho das companhias está inversamente relacionado à rotatividade dos executivos e que as empresas familiares apresentam menor rotatividade de seus administradores.
Palavras-chave: Turnover. Governança corporativa. Desempenho.
Corporate governance: an analysis of the relationship between management turnover and performance
Abstract
Corporate governance is considered a mechanism that aims to align the actions of the managers with the interests of shareholders. Researches conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s identified that the relationship between executive turnover and the entity's performance can be considered as a metric to assess the efficiency of a corporate governance system. This metric has been studied in developed economies as the United States, Denmark and Japan, but scarcely addressed in emerging economies. Therefore, this study aimed to verify whether the performance of Brazilian companies influences the probability of turnover of senior management positions, focusing on companies listed on the Brazilian Stock Exchange, from 2012 to 2017. The sample consisted of 87 companies and the analysis was based on logistic regressions. The results showed negative and significant coefficients for the variables Return on Equity, Return on Shares and Family Ownership. Thus, it can be concluded that the performance of companies is inversely related to the turnover of executives, and also that family businesses have lower turnover of their managers.
Keywords: Turnover. Corporate governance. Performance.
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